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Johnson v. Hunter: Protecting the Nonmarital
Child's Interests Despite the Minnesota
Parentage Act's Shortcomings
Patricia J. Miller*
The state of Minnesota and Stephanie Johnson Saunders,
mother, brought a paternity suit against alleged father Terry Lee
Hunter in 1969.1 The trial court orally dismissed the suit with
prejudice when Saunders failed to appear at the trial.2 Sixteen
years later, Saunder's daughter, Tia Marie Johnson, sought to es-
tablish paternity under the Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA).3 In
Johnson v. Hunter, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that dis-
missal of a paternity action brought by a parent did not preclude
the child from bringing a paternity action under the MPA sixteen
years later.4
The Johnson court examined the child's right to challenge
the paternity dismissal. The court noted that although Ms. John-
son was not named in the original action, she would be precluded
from bringing her paternity claim if she were in privity with her
mother.5 The alleged father pointed out that Ms. Johnson's pater-
nity had been before the courts years ago when the state and the
mother initially brought suit and that Ms. Johnson should be es-
topped from relitigating the matter.6
The Johnson case raised the issue of whether, in an atmos-
phere recognizing increased rights for children,7 adjudication of a
suit brought by a parent can prevent a child from later bringing a
paternity suit herself. The Johnson court examined these issues
because it could not rely squarely on the Minnesota Parentage Act
to protect Tia Marie Johnson's interests. The MPA fails to recog-
* B.A. 1989, Metropolitan State University; J.D. 1992, University of Minnesota
Law School.
1. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Minn. 1989) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-257.74 (1980).
4. 447 N.W.2d at 871.
5. I& at 873-74. Had the court found privity between Saunders and her daugh-
ter, the earlier adjudication would have been binding on Johnson. See infra notes
27-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 79.
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nize every nonmaritals child's need to be mandatorily joined as a
party to her paternity suit. Although a child "may be made a
party" to the paternity action under the MPA, the child must be
made a party in only a few circumstances.9 The MPA did not re-
quire a child in Ms. Johnson's position to be mandatorily joined,
and she was not a party to the earlier suit.lo The Johnson court,
however, recognized her interests had not been heard." The court
was forced to find another way to allow the child's interests to be
heard or risk denying the child an equal right to due process.12
This article proposes that the MPA be amended to require
mandatory joinder of all nonmarital children whose paternity is at
issue. Johnson recognized that a child's interests13 in a paternity
8. Representative Berglin, co-author of the bill adopted as the Minnesota Par-
entage Act (MPA), indicated to the Minnesota House Judiciary Committee the in-
tent to remove all references to the term "illegitimate" in the paternity statutes as
well as other state laws referring to children. Parentage Act" Hearings on S. 134
Before the House Judiciary Committee, 71st Leg., 2d Sess. 27 (1980) (statements of
Rep. Berglin, co-author) (audio tape recording of House Judiciary Committee Meet-
ing of Mar. 13, 1980, available in Minnesota Historical Society Archives, locator
number 68.F.11.3B, at revolutions 835-1043). In adopting the MPA, the legislature
specifically declared in Section 3 that "[t]he parent and child relationship may exist
regardless of the marital status of the parents," and replaced "illegitimate children"
with "children" in statutes relating to maternity and insurance benefits, custody
disputes, adoption proceedings, and duties of the Commissioner of Public Welfare
(now referred to as Human Services). Act of Apr. 23, 1980, ch. 589, 1980 Minn.
Laws 1070. The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, called the terms "legiti-
mate" and "illegitimate" archaic, further noting "[t]he Minnesota Parentage Act ap-
pears to us to reflect a studied legislative effort to eliminate the vestigial remnants
of social stigma once visited on children born out of wedlock, an effort which war-
rants the removal of the term 'illegitimate child' from the judicial vocabulary."
Minnesota ex rel. Ward v. Carlson, 409 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. 1987) (en banc).
To avoid the discriminatory and derogatory status that has been associated
with the term "illegitimate," this article uses the term "nonmarital" to refer to
children born out of wedlock. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Re-
quirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S.CAL. L.
RExv. 10, 53 n.228 (1975).
9. See MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1990). The child is a necessary party (1) when the
suit involves a minor child and lump sum payment or a compromise-an agreement
between the alleged father, the mother, and the child which defines economic obli-
gations without determining paternity, (2) when the action is to declare the nonex-
istence of a father-child relationship, or (3) when the action seeks to declare the
existence of the relationship and the child's mother denies the father-child rela-
tionship. Id. The usual purpose of a paternity suit, however, is to establish the par-
ent-child relationship of a minor. Most mothers claim rather than deny the father-
child relationship. Thus, only a relatively small group of nonmarital children are
granted this statutory right to mandatory joinder.
10. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at 872.
11. Id. at 876.
12. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
13. In addition to child support, the Johnson court recognized specific rights
unique to the child, including inheritance, medical support, dependent's allowances
under workers' compensation laws, and veteran's education benefits, as well as the
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proceeding are distinct from the parent's interests1 4 and the state's
interests.15 The MPA presently provides only some classes of
nonmarital children with adequate representation in paternity
suits and protection of their rights and benefits resulting from ad-
judication of paternity. Part I outlines the background and devel-
opment of paternity law and the legal status and rights afforded
children in MAinnesota. Part II examines the Johnson court's ma-
neuvering to avoid the denial of the child's rights that results from
a literal reading of the MPA. Part III critiques the MPA and the
Johnson decision and concludes that Johnson, although reaching a
just result for the child, demonstrates the need for amendment of
the Act. Part III also discusses the problem of a putative father's
inability to rely on the result of the original paternity action. This
article concludes by proposing amendment of the MPA to protect
the interests of all nonmarital children.' 6
"psychological and emotional benefits to the child from an accurate establishment
of paternity." Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 875 (citations omitted).
14. Adjudications of paternity frequently include an award to the mother of
medical costs of the pregnancy and childbirth. MINN. STAT. § 257.66, subd. 3 (1990).
In addition, the Johnson court noted the conflict between the interests of a mother
and child:
A mother may have a variety of reasons for not initiating paternity
proceedings: she may have a continuing relation with or affection for
the father, she may wish to avoid continuing any relation with the fa-
ther, including child support; she may wish to avoid the disapproval of
her family or the community that she believes a paternity action
would produce; she may be subject to the emotional strain and confu-
sion that often attend the birth of a child born out of wedlock and con-
tinue for a prolonged period, hindering any effort by her to seek child
support; she may be able to support the child and not foresee a change
in her circumstances.
Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 875-76 (citing In re R.W.L., 341 N.W.2d 682, 686 (Wis.
1984)).
15. "Mhe state's interest in paternity actions is primarily to prevent the child
from 'becom[ing] a public charge' by securing child support." Johnson, 447 N.W.2d
at 875 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 257.19).
16. The prevailing trend, as recognized by Minnesota courts as well as the
United States Supreme Court, is toward recognition that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967). As early as 1973, the Court held that marital and nonmarital children
should be afforded equal treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment for purposes of ordering parental support. Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 538 (1973). However, the courts have been reluctant to discuss whether
marital and nonmarital children command equal treatment for all substantive
rights. In later cases the courts have limited their opinions to particular rights of
nonmarital children. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. Therefore, the
argument for mandatory joinder of nonmarital children in paternity suits does not
reach the level of a fundamental rights analysis. However, the lower level of scru-
tiny for due process rights seems inadequate in light of the parent-child relation-
ship. This article examines the dilemma.
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I. Paternity Law and Children's Rights
A. Legal Status of Children
A minor is defined as "[a]n infant or person who is under the
age of legal competence."x 7 Society considers children too imma-
ture and inexperienced to manage their own affairs.18 Because of
this perceived incompetence, children do not have the same legal
rights as adults.19 The nation's courts have not often addressed
whether children have constitutional and statutory interests in
their own right, because the courts usually presume a parent or
guardian has adequately represented the child's interests.
Historically, the courts considered parents the natural guardi-
ans of their children's interests and as such able to bring suit on
behalf of their children.2 0 Our legal system has traditionally oper-
ated in a paternalistic manner, presuming that parents will make
decisions for their children in the children's best interests.2 1
Should parents neglect that duty, however, the courts intervene to
protect children from harming themselves or their property by
their own rash or uninformed acts, or to protect children from un-
scrupulous parties.22 In some respects the paternalistic approach is
changing. Many states have granted children statutory rights23 to
such things as financial support from their parents, educational
17. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 516 (5th ed. 1983). The reference to "legal age"
reads: "The age at which a person may enter into binding contracts or commit other
legal acts. In most states a minor reaches legal age or majority ... at age 18; though
for certain acts (e.g. drinking) it may be higher, and for others (e.g. driving) it may
be lower." Id. at 463-64.
18. See, e.g. In re Davidson's Will, 223 Minn. 268, 26 N.W.2d 223 (1947) (refer-
ring to nonmajority status as the "disability of infancy").
19. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state's authority to su-
pervise and control infants broader than its authority over adults); George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.) (state may deny certain privileges to infants
which may be granted to adults), cert denied 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
20. State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 4, 42 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1950).
21. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Chil& The Role of Independ-
ent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REv. 681, 682-87 (1987).
22. Traditionally, it is our legal policy to protect the interests of minor children
incapable of looking after their own affairs. See, e.g., In re Davidson's Will, 223
Minn. 268, 272, 26 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1947). It is the right and duty of the court, even
though it has appointed a representative for the infant, to protect the rights and
interest of an infant. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 13
F.R.D. 98 (D.C. Ill. 1952); Workman v. Workman, 174 Neb. 471, 118 N.W.2d 764
(1962) (minor involved in litigation though not a party); Miller v. Belanger, 275
Wis. 187, 81 N.W.2d 545 (1957) (infant a party to litigation).
23. States including Alaska, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, and
West Virginia have child emancipation statutes to free children from the custody,
care and control of their parents. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 provides "reasonable efforts" be made to keep families together with assist-
ance from state and federal social and financial services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq.
and §§ 670 et seq. (1980). Minnesota provides children rights to education and in-
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benefits,2 4 and inheritance rights.
Questions of adequate representation for a child arise when a
parent's adjudication affects a child's interest. Under the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, adjudication of a claim or is-
sue binds only a person who is a party or who is in privity with a
party to a lawsuit.25 Estoppel precludes relitigation of claims or is-
sues when the claim or issue is identical, when there was a final
judgment on the merits, when the estopped party was a party to or
in privity with a party to the prior suit, and when the estopped
party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adju-
dicated claim or issue.26 In general, the courts recognize no par-
ent-child privity27 except when the parent or child had a sufficient
interest in the outcome of the other's suit,28 or has had her inter-
ests adequately represented.29 The policies behind the application
of estoppel include reducing the number of lawsuits, increasing ju-
dicial efficiency, promoting consistency and finality, and bolstering
heritance. See generally, Mark Soler, An Introduction to Children's Rights, 74
A.B.A. J. 52, 53-56 (Dec. 1988).
24. While the Supreme Court has not deemed publicly financed education a
fundamental right, it has upheld state legislation financing primary and secondary
schools through property taxes. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). Parents may control their child's education within the confines of
state legislation. Parents may send their children to private rather than public
schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Under the Free Exercise
of Religion clause, the Court has held a state could not require members of the
Amish Church to send their children to public school, since their religiously based
refusal to do so outweighed the state's interest. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214 (1972). Although the Court did not discuss the interest of the Amish children
themselves, Justice Douglas would have supported the child's interest against the
wishes of the parent. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
25. James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collat-
eral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383, 384 (1983).
This article provides a succinct background of the estoppel doctrine, focusing on the
constitutional impact of estoppel when applied against nonparties.
26. Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civ. Rts., 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982).
27. See, e.g., Brown v. Terry, 375 So. 2d 457, 458-59 (Ala. 1979); James W. Moore
et al., 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.411[11] (1988). Minnesota does not recog-
nize a general parent-child privity and instead determines privity on a case-by-case
basis. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. 1989) (citing as an example
McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 59, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967)).
28. Three theoretical bases for privity include successive relationship to the
same right, concurrent relationship to the same rights, and representation of the
interests of the same person. MooRE et al., supra note 22, 0.411[12] at 482.
29. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent an infant whose in-
terests may be adversely affected by the proceeding. Current law requires such ap-
pointment when a child is made a party to a paternity action in Minnesota. MINN.
STAT. § 257.60 (1990). Before the MPA was enacted (and even today whenever a
child is not made a party), the commissioner of Human Services has the duty to
safeguard the child's interests. MINN. STAT. § 257.33 (compare 1969 with 1989
version).
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confidence in the judicial system.30 As Johnson illustrates, how-
ever, society's growing recognition of the child as an interested
party in his own right may at times conflict with these long-stand-
ing policies.
The jurisprudential history of children's issues demonstrates
the importance of evolving social policy in determining children's
rights. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledge certain constitutional rights due children.3 1 For exam-
ple, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District 32 held that children "are 'persons' under our Constitution
... possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect
.... " including freedom of speech 33 and liberty interests which re-
quire protection by a due process right to counsel.34 Although
Minnesota courts frequently have considered the due process
rights of adults in cases involving children,3 5 they have less fre-
30. Pielemeier, supra note 25, at 394.
31. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (before being suspended from
school, children are entitled to procedural safeguards); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school age children have constitutional
right to freedom of speech); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (constitutional right to
due process applies to juveniles as well as adults).
32. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
33. 1d at 511. "[N]either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. The Tinker
Court allowed school children First Amendment rights to free speech. Id, The
Court, however, has affirmed broad censorship powers of school officials to control
student expression "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
This limitation demonstrates an application of the Court's generally paternalistic
policy.
The right to privacy in familial relationships is also subject to heightened levels
of scrutiny. The right to privacy, encompassing freedom of choice in marital rela-
tionships, child bearing and child rearing, has been termed a "fundamental" right.
Cary v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). However, the extent of the constitutional guarantees protecting the
parent-nonmarital child relationship has yet to be deemed "fundamental" by the
Court.
34. "IN]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone," declared the Gault Court when it reversed a denial of habeas corpus peti-
tion of a 15 year-old juvenile delinquent on due process grounds, including lack of
notice of the child's right to counsel. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
35. The Minnesota courts recognize the due process rights of adults in litigation
alleging child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn.
1990); Matter of Welfare of J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1986); State v. Durfee, 322
N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
Adults' rights to due process in cases involving custody and child support are
discussed in the following: In re Marriage of Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 1989);
State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1986); State v. Ibarra, 355 N.W.2d 125
(Minn. 1984); Moberg v. Moberg, 347 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1984).
When paternity is at issue, the courts have frequently emphasized the alleged
parent's rights to due process. See, e.g., Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.
1985); Machacek v. Voss, 361 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1985); Howells v. McKibben, 281
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quently addressed the process due the children themselves.3 6
However, Minnesota does statutorily recognize that a minor party
in a paternity suit is entitled to court-appointed counsel if unable
to pay.3 7
Deciding which constitutional rights are extended to children
and the scope of those rights requires balancing the interests of
the child, the parent, and the government.38 The Supreme Court,
however, is hesitant to disturb the "sanctity" of the family3 9 and to
date has examined the parent-child relationship at a less-than-
strict level of scrutiny.4 0 Although the definition of "family" en-
compasses nontraditional family units,41 legislation sometimes
N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1979); State ex rel Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d
140 (1974); State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680 (1950); Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d
571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Markert v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
36. This is not to say that the Minnesota courts have ignored children's due pro-
cess rights completely. As early as 1948, Minnesota courts recognized a minor's due
process rights in commitment proceedings. "[The requirement of notice] must be
equally applicable to proceedings involving the competency of minors, who are ordi-
narily totally incapable of asserting or protecting their rights.... Even in the ab-
sence of a statute [or motion]... ,the court should take such protective measures
on its own" to adequately safeguard the child's interests by appointment of a disin-
terested party as guardian ad litem. In re Wretlind, 225 Minn. 554, 561, 32 N.W.2d
161, 166 (1948). Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1989) (child's due pro-
cess rights in paternity action); Lindell v. Oak Park Coop. Creamery, 369 N.W.2d
505 (Minn. 1985) (child's right to due process in workers' compensation claim);
M.A.D. v. P.R., 277 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. 1979) (paternity suit); Unborn Child v. Evans,
310 Minn. 197, 245 N.W.2d 600 (1976) (nonmarital child's rights to proceeds of al-
leged father's state insurance policy). Cf Matter of Welfare of M.A.C., 455 N.W.2d
494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (due process in delinquency proceeding); Estate of Jones
by Blume v. Kvamme, 430 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (children's opportunity
to be heard regarding distribution of father's estate).
37. MINN. STAT. § 257.69 (1990).
38. See generally, Laurence D. Houlgate, The Child as a Person" Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AuTHOR-
rry, AND STATE POWER (W. Aiken & H. LaFollette eds.) (1980) at 221-36 (conclud-
ing children, as a class different from adults, have some constitutional rights which
will be determined by social policy).
39. "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The
Court hesitated to break up the family unit by removing the children from the
home, even though the family was nontraditional in that the mother and father of
the children were not married. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), infra
note 53. Where disruption of an existing marriage was possible the Court is willing
to preserve a fiction of legitimacy and overlook biological evidence of nonpaternity.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139, infra notes 40, 123.
40. Note, however, that the dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D. points out that
four Justices believe the putative natural father has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in the parent-child relationship since both elements of biology and de-
velopment of a relationship (evidenced by support, visitation, etc.) are established,
and another Justice assumes the putative father has a protected liberty interest.
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. See infra notes 52-55.
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makes distinctions based on legitimacy. When legislatures do
make these distinctions, equal protection questions arise.
B. Equal Protection for Nonmarital Children
The distinction between marital and nonmarital children car-
ries not only social stigma42 but legal consequences as well.43
When the legislature makes a distinction between marital and
nonmarital children, such classification is subject to scrutiny to
avoid unconstitutional results. Paternity legislation affects a
child's right to due process44 because denial of paternity can affect
not only a child's right to support or a share in a parent's estate,45
but the denial also arguably constitutes a taking of a child's liberty
interest in the parent-child relationship46 without notice and an
42. "The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condem-
nation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage." Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
43. For example, the common law recognizes no duty of support for illegitimate
children. Most states have imposed this duty upon parents of illegitimate children
by statute and provide proceedings to establish paternity. Comment, Privity, Pre-
clusion, and the Parent-Child Relationship, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 632 n.108. See
generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGrrlMACY: LAW AND SocIAL PoLICY (1971) (a
comprehensive study of illegitimacy, its legal status and effects).
44. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution restricts the states
from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Children are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
45. Children are entitled to such things as veterans' educational benefits, rights
to inheritance through intestate succession, and worker's compensation benefits for
dependents. See infra note 79. Such benefits would not be available to a child
should a court make a finding of nonpaternity. Thus, a child necessarily has inter-
ests needing protection in a paternity action.
A general paternity determination... is rife with far reaching poten-
tial, and possibly yet unforeseen, legal consequences concerning, for
example, rights of inheritance from or through collateral relatives;
those that may ensue under statutes banning prohibited marriages;
claims arising under public policy or laws prohibiting or governing
human artificial insemination or surrogate parentage; and undoubtedly
others of equal seriousness.
Voss v. Duerscherl, 425 N.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Minn. 1988) (footnotes omitted) (hold-
ing paternity action not brought by or on behalf of child does not survive death of
putative father once personal representative is discharged).
46. The parent-child relationship is considered by many to fall into the penum-
bra of rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to privacy, a "liberty" interest, encompasses familial relationships, mar-
riage, and child bearing. See supra note 33. The Supreme Court Justices, however,
disagree as to how to analyze which interests are fundamental.
The parent-nonmarital child relationship was examined in Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). A fragmented court held that a California paternity
statute creating the presumption that a child born to a married woman living with
her husband is a child of the marriage does not violate the putative natural father's
due process rights, even in light of blood tests indicating a 98.07 percent probability
of paternity. Id. at 111. The parent-nonmarital child relationship, where the child
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opportunity to be heard. More importantly, paternity legislation
affects a child's equal protection rights when marital children are
treated differently from nonmarital children.
In the early days of common law, marital children and
nonmarital children were treated differently. Nonmarital children
were not entitled to support 47 or inheritance from their fathers.48
More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has rec-
is born into an existing marital union, was not a liberty interest under the plural-
ity's analysis of due process questions. Id. at 127. The statute was upheld under
the rational basis test. Id. at 131.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized that five Justices "refuse to fore-
close 'the possibility that a natural father might ever have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and
cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth."' Id
at 136. The Justices disagreed as to the proper analysis to define a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. They disagreed about how specific an interest was at is-
sue ("parenthood" versus "natural father's rights vis-a-vis a child whose mother is
married to another") and what level of societal tradition need be examined. Bren-
nan pointed out that the plurality opinion's historical analysis was fully endorsed
by only Scalia and Rehnquist, that O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in all but that
single mode of historical analysis, and that Stevens concurred in the judgment but
not in the analysis. Id. at 136.
The plurality did not decide whether a child has a liberty interest in maintain-
ing her parent-child relationship, stating that "even assuming that such a right ex-
ists" the child's due process challenge is even weaker than her father's, since she
claimed a right to maintain relationships with both her putative natural father and
her mother's husband. Id. at 130. The dissent suggested that it would have found a
liberty interest in the relationship between the child and her putative natural fa-
ther. Id. at 146-47.
47. State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 20, 42 N.W.2d 680, 692 (1950) (Knutson, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
48. Although the legislature has expressed their intent to remove the words "il-
legitimate child" from Minnesota statutes, the courts adhere to the traditional view
in the area of inheritance. When the word "child" is used in a statute, deed, or will,
Minnesota courts have construed the term to mean a marital child and not a
nonmarital child, unless language, context, or particular circumstances reflect an
intent to the contrary. See, e.g., In re Estate of Karger, 253 Minn. 542, 93 N.W.2d
137 (1958). In In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970), the
Minnesota court held that an illegitimate child could be required to produce an at-
tested written declaration of paternity made by the putative father in order to in-
herit from his estate. The court explained the distinction was not based solely on
illegitimate status but had the required rational relationship to the purpose of dece-
dent statutes, to effectuate the presumed desires and intention of the decedent. Id.
at 336, 717.
Although in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Supreme Court found
violation of equal protection in statutes providing nonmarital children could inherit
from their mothers only while marital children inherited from both mothers and
fathers, the Court found no constitutional problem with a statute conditioning in-
heritance by nonmarital children upon an order of paternity in a suit instituted
within two years of the child's birth. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The Court
held the evidentiary condition was substantially related to the important state in-
terest in just and orderly property disposition in light of problems of proof of pater-
nity and possible invalid claims. Id. at 259-60.
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ognized some equal rights for nonmarital children49 by emphasiz-
ing that statutory classifications based on illegitimacy will be
subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. A classification based on nonmarital birth must be sub-
stantially related to an important state interest.5 0
Classifications based on legitimacy were first scrutinized in
light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment two decades ago. Under this scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme
Court has found Louisiana's wrongful death statute, providing no
benefits for nonmarital children, unconstitutional.51 The Court
later held unconstitutional a worker's compensation law that de-
nied recovery to unacknowledged nonmarital children5 2 and
struck down a statute that created an irrebuttable presumption
that unmarried fathers were unfit to have custody of their chil-
dren.5 3 The Supreme Court has also recognized a nonmarital
49. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980). Accord Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456 (1988).
51. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In a companion case, Glona v. Ameri-
can Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., the Court also found unconstitutional a statutory provi-
sion disallowing recovery for a mother for the wrongful death of her nonmarital
children. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. & Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Compare
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), where the Supreme Court found no uncon-
stitutional discrimination against fathers when a statute permitted mothers of
nonmarital children but not fathers to sue for the child's wrongful death. Id. The
Court pointed out the dissimilar positions (only fathers could unilaterally legitimize
a child) and noted the statute was reasonably related to the legitimate state interest
in establishing paternity and avoiding multiple wrongful death suits based on al-
leged paternity. Id. at 357-58. See generally Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parent-
age Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2-8 (1974) (for cases leading up to creation of the Uniform
Parentage Act. Professor Krause served as reporter-drafter to the Committee on a
Uniform Parentage Act).
Levy's broad holding that nonmarital children are persons within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus entitled to equal protection of a state's
laws has been repeatedly cited in support of constitutional rights for children. "[I]t
is invidious to discriminate against [nonmarital children] when no action, conduct,
or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done to the
mother." Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. In later cases, however, the Court has limited its
discussions to particular rights or duties affecting the parent-nonmarital child rela-
tionship, rather than substantive legal rights in general. See supra notes 46-47.
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that Levy and Giona established
that discrimination solely upon nonmarital status is a denial of equal protection.
See Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1990).
52. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Under Louisiana
law, only dependent marital children and dependent acknowledged nonmarital
children could recover. Id. at 167. The Court found this violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, noting that an "unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much
from the loss of a parent as a child born in wedlock or an illegitimate later ac-
knowledged." Id. at 169.
53. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court noted the state could not,
consistent with due process requirements, merely presume unmarried fathers were
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child's equal protection right to paternal support5 4 and held that
the statute of limitations for paternity actions must be long enough
to "provide a reasonable opportunity" to bring claims on behalf of
nonmarital children5s The trend56 is clearly to eliminate discrimi-
nation between marital and nonmarital children,57 since "no child
is responsible for his birth." s
C. Uniform Parentage Act of 197359 (UPA)
By the late 1960's, the United States Supreme Court had rec-
unsuitable parents. Unwed fathers could not be denied a hearing on fitness that
was accorded to all other parents whose custody of their children was challenged.
54. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (equal protection for nonmarital chil-
dren when father has duty to support marital children). The Court emphasized:
[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children
by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. We
therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on
behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers, there
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essen-
tial right to a child simply because its natural father has not married
its mother.
Id at 538.
55. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). "First the period for obtaining sup-
port.., must be sufficiently long... to present a reasonable opportunity ... to
assert claims on [the children's] behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that
opportunity must be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the liti-
gation of stale or fraudulent claims." Id at 99-100.
56. From Levy to Michael H., the Court emphasizes that any distinction on the
basis of legitimacy is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny so as not to violate
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a comprehensive
list of citations, see Carol DeNardo Spoor, Paternity Determinations in Washing-
ton Balancing the Interests of All Parties, 8 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 653, 653 n.2
(1985).
57. "[S]tate and federal law may not discriminate between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children in any significant area other than inheritance." Krause, The Uni-
form Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974).
58. "Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent."
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
One argument made for beneficial treatment of marital children compared to
nonmarital children is to support the traditional family unit and discourage unwed
parenthood. However, as Weber points out, the child is blameless for the circum-
stances of its birth. Moreover, granting unwed mothers access to wrongful death
benefits should a child die, for example, will not encourage having children out of
wedlock. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
59. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973). The Prefatory Note of the
Act stated its purpose:
[I n providing substantive legal equality for all children regardless of
the marital status of their parents, the present Act merely fulfills the
mandate of the Constitution. With the exception of the child's right to
inherit from his intestate father, which a growing number of states has
[sic] provided without constitutional compulsion, the equal treatment
provided by the Act is not the Conference's 'wishful thinking.' It is
the law of the land.
Id at 289. The Act attempts to guide the states through the maze of rights granted
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ognized the interests of a child in the determination of the parent-
child relationship,6 0 but state and lower federal courts had reached
varying decisions in applying the principle of blameless birth sta-
tus to areas of substantive law.61
Because children and their parents were subject to different
treatment depending on the court's interpretation of a parent-child
relationship, the statutory means of obtaining paternity adjudica-
tion became important. However, even statutory procedure for es-
tablishing paternity varied among the states. In the light of these
divergent court and statutory schemes to determine paternity,
scholars and legislators suggested a uniform statutory scheme to
comply with the recent Supreme Court rulings requiring equal
protection for nonmarital children and to clarify the rights of the
child.
Work on uniform paternity laws began in 1969,62 and the re-
sulting Uniform Parentage Act was approved in 1973. According
to the reporter-draftsman, Professor Harry D. Krause, the Uni-
form Parentage Act was intended to fill the vacuum created by di-
verse approaches to nonmarital children among the jurisdictions:
Its guiding principle is full equality for all children, [marital]
and [nonmarital], in their legal relationship with both parents.
Moreover, the Act emphasizes that the right in question is the
right of the child-not the right of his mother as current state
laws insist. Accordingly, the mother may not stand in her
child's way .... 63
To achieve this purpose, Section 9 of the UPA requires that a child
be made a party to all paternity actions64 and be represented by a
and denied by providing a constitutionally acceptable means of determining
paternity.
60. The Supreme Court stepped in to review issues in the areas of wrongful
death legislation, inheritance, welfare assistance, custody, workers compensation,
and adoption. See supra notes 51-58.
61. The California court in Ruddock v. Ohis emphatically stated that:
the establishment of the parent-child relationship is the most funda-
mental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with per-
sonal liberty and the most basic of constitutional rights. To hold a
child bound prospectively by a finding of nonpaternity in [an] ... ac-
tion in which the child was not a party would be to allow the conduct
of the [parent] to foreclose the most fundamental right a child pos-
sesses in our system of jurisprudence.
91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277-78, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1979). But cf. Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (a California statute creating a presumption of legitimacy
made assertion of biological paternity legally impossible, even in the face of blood
tests indicating a 98.07 percent probability of paternity).
62. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 287 (1973).
63. Harry D. Krause, The UnVorm Parentage Act, 8 FAm. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974) (sec-
tion references omitted).
64. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 9, 9B U.L.A. at 312 (1973). Section 9 of the UPA
states:
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general guardian6 5 or a guardian ad litem66 appointed by the court;
under the UPA, the child's mother or father may not represent
the child.67 Eighteen states6 s have adopted the UPA.69
D. Minnesota Parentage Act7O of 1980 (MPA)
In light of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the
recently introduced UPA, Minnesota recognized the need to up-
date its paternity legislation to avoid constitutional challenges.
Although the legislature first considered adoption of the UPA in
1974, Minnesota's final version of the UPA was not adopted until
1980. As originally introduced in the Minnesota State Senate,
7 1
The child shall be made a party to the action. If he is a minor he shall
be represented by his general guardian or a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed by the court. The child's mother or father may not represent
the child as guardian or otherwise. The court may appoint the [appro-
priate state agency] as guardian ad litem for the child. The natural
mother, each man presumed to be the father under Section 4, and each
man alleged to be the natural father, shall be made parties or, if not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, shall be given notice of the ac-
tion in a manner prescribed by the court and an opportunity to be
heard. The court may align the parties.
Id
65. A general guardian is the person lawfully invested with the power, and
charged with the duty, of taking care of and controlling the person and estate of a
minor child. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 361-62 (5th ed. 1983).
66. "A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court to prose-
cute or defend, in behalf of an infant ... .a suit to which he is a party, and such
guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent the interests of the infant
... in the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (5th ed. 1983).
67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 9, 9B U.L.A. at 312 (1973). See supra note 64. The
UPA drafters not only use the words "shall be made a party," they specifically state
that the mother and father may not represent the child's interest. Their explana-
tion is contained in the Comment to Section 9:
This Section emphasizes that the child is a party to the action. While
this is a departure from the law of a number of states which have
viewed the mother as the sole party in interest, this provision is con-
sidered a necessary consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
establishing the child's substantive rights vis-a-vis his father. The
mother or father may not represent the child in the action, since their
interests may conflict with those of the child.
68. The major provisions of the UPA have been adopted in Alabama, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island (which has
adopted the format and many provisions of the Uniform Paternity Act as well),
Washington, and Wyoming.
69. Courts have held that the UPA and similar amendments to paternity stat-
utes are "remedial" in nature. Lisa Wilson Caddes, The Determination of Paternity
and its Consequences for the filegitimate 0hild, 8 Juv. L. 486, 487 (1984) (citing Doe
v. Roe, 67 Haw. 63, 677 P.2d 468 (1984); R.L.G. v. T.L.E., 454 N.E.2d 1268 (Ind. App.
1983)). The parentage act is to be applied retroactively and interpreted liberally.
Id. at 487 (citing RL.G., 454 N.E.2d at 1270).
70. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-257.74 (1980).
71. Senate File No. 134 was introduced January 15, 1979, by Representatives
1991]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 10:81
the MPA was almost identical to the Uniform Act. Yet by the
time the House passed the Minnesota Parentage Act,72 a seemingly
insignificant change was made to the "Parties" section of the
MPA: joinder of a child in a paternity action was deemed discre-
tionary rather than mandatory.73
Before adoption of the MPA, Minnesota's paternity statutes
allowed a mother to bring a complaint, but the statutes did not ad-
dress whether a child had standing.74 The state joined the mother,
the complaining witness, in paternity suits brought into court.75
Minnesota courts focused on the mother's right to child support
and childbearing expenses, 6 and on the state's interest in reducing
welfare costs by forcing fathers to support their children.77 The
child's interests were not individually addressed.
Although the Commissioner of Public Welfare did have a
duty "to take care that the interests of the child are safeguarded
[and] that appropriate steps are taken to establish his paternity,"78
Davies, Merriam, Siller, and J. Keefe. Parentage Act, ch. 589, 1980 Minn. Laws
(codified as amended at MNN. STAT. §§ 257.51-257.74 (1990)).
72. After its first reading in the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee
on Judiciary, which referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Judicial Administra-
tion. It eventually returned to the Senate floor where the bill as amended passed
37-13 on May 3, 1979. On May 7, 1979, S.F. No. 134 was introduced in the House by
Representative Berglin. The House referred the bill to its Committee on Judiciary.
That committee reported on March 19, 1980. On April 10, 1980 the bill passed the
House as amended 126-0. On April 11, 1980, the Senate passed the bill, as amended
by the House, 57-0. Chapter 589 was signed into law as the parentage act on April
23, 1980. S. 134, 71st Leg., 2d Sess. 1980 Minn. Laws 589 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-257.74 (1990)).
73. MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1980). Legislative history reveals the initial introduc-
tion of the section entitled "Parties" included the Uniform Act's mandatory lan-
guage: "[a] child shall be made a party ...... By the March 19, 1980, House
Judiciary Committee meeting, that section of the unofficial engrossment of the bill
had been amended, presumably by the author of the bill, to read "[a] child may be
made a party ...." Research of existing legislative materials does not reveal the
author nor the purpose of the change. S. 134, 71st Leg., 2d Sess., 1980 Minn. Laws
589 (various audio tapes and recorded minutes of Senate and House committees lo-
cated at the Minnesota Historical Research Center Archives, St. Paul, Minnesota)
(emphasis added).
74. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.18-257.19 (repealed 1971).
75. Id
76. See, e.g., State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 4, 42 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1950) (mother of
child has a "definite personal financial interest" in paternity support awards).
77. Id at 7, 42 N.W.2d at 684. Paternity suits are necessary "for the indemnity
of society against the expense of the support of the child." Reilly v. Shapiro, 196
Minn. 376, 381, 265 N.W. 284, 287 (1936). Because the state has a financial interest
in adjudication of paternity, the legislature may have assumed the state would auto-
matically protect the child's interest in the adjudication when bringing a paternity
suit. MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1990). If the only interest the child had was financial,
this assumption might be adequate. However, as is discussed in notes 46 and 80, fi-
nancial support is only one of the child's interests in adjudication of paternity.
78. MINN. STAT. § 257.33 (1969), subsequently amended. Prior to Minnesota
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Minnesota's legislature appears to have recognized that the child's
interests in financial support and legal recognition as a child of an
adjudicated father are distinct from a parent's and from the state's
interests. 79 The MPA presently states that neither a parent8 o nor
the Commissioner of Human Services8' can represent a child in a
disputed paternity suit.
Only relatively recently have state courts come to recognize
that a child's and a parent's interests are different in a paternity
suit.82 The child has an interest in establishing paternity to deter-
mine rights to support as well as a medical history, heritage, and
workers' compensation or social security benefits should the par-
ent be injured.83 Although some mothers bring paternity suits to
obtain child support or reimbursement for pregnancy costs, other
mothers may not wish to continue a relationship with the putative
father or may want to avoid community disapproval and the emo-
tional distress of bringing a paternity suit.s 4 A lack of parent-
child privity, accompanied by a statute making joinder of the child
only discretionary may leave the nonmarital child's interests un-
Statute § 257.33, § 257.19 (since repealed) mandated that the county attorney must
prosecute "to assist the mother as well as to protect the county's interest so that
the child may not become a public charge." State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 8, 42 N.W.2d
680, 685 (1950).
79. Some of the rights unique to a child include inheritance (MINN. STAT.
§ 524.2-109); medical support (MINN. STAT. § 518.171, subd. 5); causes of action
(MINN. STAT. ch. 573); workers' compensation for dependents (MINN. STAT.
§ 176.111, subd. 1); and veteran's education benefits (MINN. STAT. §§ 197.75-197.752).
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Johnson v. Hunter also recognizes the "psycho-
logical and emotional benefits to the child from an accurate establishment of pater-
nity." 447 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Minn. 1989) (en banc).
80. MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1990).
81. The original MPA allowed the commissioner to act as guardian ad litem for
the child; however, the potentially conflicting interests between child and state
were recognized and the statute amended striking the language allowing the com-
missioner to act as guardian ad litem. MINN. STAT. § 257.60, 1983 Minn. Laws at
1753.
82. The California Supreme Court summed up the interests of a child in a pa-
ternity proceeding-
The child, to a large extent forgotten in such proceedings, has been
termed the "principal plaintiff" in a paternity action. In a sense, it is
the child's identity that is litigated in a proceeding to determine par-
entage. Any determination that a particular individual is a child's bio-
logical father may have profound sociological and psychological
ramifications. Further, the child's rights of support and inheritance
against the father are at issue as well as his or her future obligation to
support the father. "If the child is to have anything, it must have a
right to have his paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner."
Paula Roberts & John Ott, The Right to Counsel in Paternity Proceedings, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw 1170, 1176-77 (Feb. 1985) (citing Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d
226 (Cal. 1979)).
83. See supra note 79.
84. See supra note 14.
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protected and also encourage multiple paternity actions. A pater-
nity suit brought without a child as a party or without the child's
specific interests addressed on the merits will not be binding
against the child.85
Passage of the MPA in 1980 specifically gave the child, as
well as the mother and presumptive father, standing to sue.s6 Un-
like the UPA, however, the MPA does not require the child be
joined in every action to establish paternity.8 7 Although amend-
ments to the MPA88 show that the legislature may have under-
stood a child's need to be a party, the language does not reflect a
complete recognition of the child's unique interests because not all
nonmarital children are protected by being made parties.89
85. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 454 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. App. 1990) (citing with ap-
proval Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at 877).
86. MINN. STAT. § 257.57 (1980).
87. Compare language of UPA § 9, 9B U.L.A. at 312 (1973) (supra note 64) with
MPA, MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1990) (infra note 89).
88. MINN. STAT. § 257.60 has been amended three times since it was adopted in
1980. It was first amended in 1983 to reflect the legislature's acknowledgement of
the potentially conflicting interests of the child and the Commission of Public Wel-
fare. In 1980 the statute read, in pertinent part:
The court may appoint the commissioner of public welfare as guardian
ad litem for the child.... If the child is a minor and the case involves
a compromise.. .or a lump sum payment.. .the child shall be made a
party and the commissioner of public welfare shall be appointed as
guardian ad litem before the court approves a compromise or orders a
lump sum payment.
Parentage Act, ch. 589, § 10, 1980 Minn. Laws. In 1983 the legislature amended
MINN. STAT. § 257.60, excluding the language allowing appointment of the commis-
sioner as guardian ad litem. Act approved June 9, 1983, ch. 308, § 7, 1983 Minn.
Laws.
The 1984 amendment simply changed the reference to the commissioner of
"public welfare" to "human services." Act approved May 2, 1984, ch. 654, art. 5,
§ 58, 1984 Minn. Laws.
The 1987 amendment expanded the requirement of joining the child as a party
to the paternity suit by requiring the child be made a party not only whenever a
compromise or lump sum payment was under consideration, but also whenever
nonexistence of a minor's father-child relationship was sought, or whenever a
mother denied existence of a father-child relationship being sought. Act approved
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 3, § 47, 1987 Minn. Laws. See infra note 89 (language of
the most recent amendment to MINN. STAT. § 257.60).
89. The statute presently reads:
The child may be made a party to the action. If the child is a minor
and is made a party, a general guardian or a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed by the court to represent the child. The child's mother or
father may not represent the child as guardian or otherwise.... The
child shall be made a party whenever:
(1) the child is a minor and the case involves a compromise under
section 257.64, subdivision 1, or a lump sum payment under section
257.66, subdivision 4, in which case the commissioner of human serv-
ices shall also be made a party; or
(2) the child is a minor and the action is to declare the nonexis-
tence of the father and child relationship; or
(3) an action to declare the existence of the father and child rela-
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II. Protecting the Nonmarital Child's Interests
The Johnson court was faced with determining whether Tia
Marie Johnson, a child unrepresented in the initial paternity ac-
tion, could litigate the matter in a later action. The court ex-
amined the case in light of both Minnesota's Parentage Act and
present social policy. The court recognized the policy of protecting
the particular interests of the children in adjudication of paternity,
but the court could not rely on the MPA as a mechanism for John-
son's interests to be heard; Johnson did not fit into one of the
three categories which required joinder. The case did not involve a
compromise or a lump sum payment by the alleged father, nor did
her mother deny existence of the relationship being sought.90 In-
stead, the Johnson court had to rely on other arguments to achieve
its goal of protecting the child.
Johnson v. Hunter presented a potential conflict with the
MPA. In 1969, Stephanie Johnson Saunders brought a paternity
action against Tia Marie Johnson's alleged father, Terry Lee
Hunter.9 1 At that time, Johnson was only six months old. She
was not named as a party to the action nor was she represented by
independent counsel.92 When Saunders, Johnson's mother, failed
to appear at the hearing, the court orally dismissed the case with
prejudice for lack of prosecution.9 3 In 1985, sixteen years later,
Saunders again raised a paternity claim alleging Terry Lee Hunter
was the father.94 Tia Marie Johnson herself was substituted as
plaintiff, and the court appointed a guardian ad litem for her.95 In
1988 Terry Lee Hunter obtained a written order acknowledging
the court's earlier oral dismissal with prejudice.96 Tia Marie John-
son's paternity action was dismissed on the basis of res judicata,97
tionship is brought by a man presumed to be the father under section
257.55, or a man who alleges to be the father, and the mother of the
child denies the existence of the father and child relationship.
MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (1990).
90. See supra note 88.





96. The Hennepin County Court issued the order nunc pro tunc as "merely a
housekeeping chore" to formalize the dismissal with prejudice orally ordered in
1969. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at 873. An order nunc pro tunc is an order of
a court entered after the time when it should have been done, with retroactive ef-
fect. Its purpose is "not to supply omitted action, but to supply omission in record
of action really had but omitted through inadvertence or mistake." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 553-54 (5th ed. 1983).
97. Johnson v. Hunter, 435 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). A dismissal
for lack of prosecution, though a nonsubstantive ground, operates as an adjudica-
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and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals.9 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's ac-
tion in light of not only res judicata and privity issues, but also the
state of paternity law from 1969 through the present version of the
MPA. 99 The court bypassed the MPA's mandate that the child be
made a party to the action only in enumerated cases.' 0 Johnson's
conclusion tracks public policy trends that recognize the "para-
mount interests of a child in an adjudication on the merits of
paternity."101
The Johnson court held that, although the lower court cor-
rectly exercised its discretion in refusing to vacate the 1969 dismis-
sal with prejudice, Tia Marie Johnson was not barred from
bringing a paternity action.10 2 Although dismissal with prejudice
is a bar to subsequent suits as an adjudication on the merits, 0 3 res
judicata will preclude a subsequent suit only between the same
parties or those in privity with the parties. 04
The court held that Tia Marie Johnson was not in privity
with her mother nor with the state in the previous action since
neither, by failing to prosecute, adequately represented her spe-
cific interests in the 1969 action.105 Therefore, res judicata did not
bar Johnson's paternity action against Hunter.106 Under 1969 Min-
nesota law, Tia Marie Johnson had no statutory standing to bring a
paternity suit; the mother or the state initiated such suits and
tion on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at
873 (citing Lampert Lumber Co. v. Joyce, 405 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1987) and
Firoved v. General Motors Corp., 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967)).
98. Johnson v. Hunter, 435 N.W.2d 821, 823-24 (Minn. App. 1989).
99. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 874.
100. See supra note 89.
101. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 876.
102. Id.
103. Under the doctrine of res judicata, final judgment on a claim bars any sub-
sequent action on the claim. Merger and bar precludes relitigation of claims identi-
cal to those already litigated by the parties in a prior action, while collateral
estoppel bars relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in previous liti-
gation. 4 D. MCFARLAND & W. KEPPEL, MwINNESOTA CrVIL PRACTIcE 114 (1979).
104. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. The parties agreed the claim
at bar concerning the paternity of Tia Marie Johnson was identical to the claim
presented in the 1969 action. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 873. The court followed long-
standing precedent, noting that a dismissal with prejudice, though nonsubstantive,
"operates as an adjudication on the merits." Id. (citing with approval Lampert
Lumber Co. v. Joyce, 405 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1987) and Firoved v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1967)). Because the state and Ms. Saunders
were parties to the 1969 action, and because they had the opportunity to litigate the
claim on its merits, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the state and Ms. Saun-
ders were barred by res judicata from litigating the paternity claim against Terry
Lee Hunter. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 874.
105. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 876.
106. Id.
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Johnson, the child, could not be a party to the suit at that time. 0 7
To determine whether Tia Marie Johnson and her mother
were in privity, the court considered the commonality of their in-
terests in adjudication of paternity. 0 8 In Minnesota, parent-child
privity is determined on a case-by-case basis.109 Following recent
public policy trends, the court distinguished the interests of the
mother-child support and reimbursement for pregnancy ex-
pensesl0-from the interests of the child---emotional, psychologi-
cal, and financial benefits."' Based on the inherent conflict of
interests, the Johnson court found no parent-child privity. Simi-
larly, the court noted the state's distinct interest"i2 and refused to
find privity between Tia Marie Johnson and the state."i3
III. Recognizing the Interests of the Parties to a Paternity Suit
A. The MPA Does Not Treat All Nonmarital Children
Equally
Unlike the UPA, Minnesota's version of the Parentage Act
treats nonmarital children unequally by not requiring that all chil-
dren be made parties to suits adjudicating their paternity. The
MPA recognizes three classes of nonmarital children that must be
made parties: minor children in paternity suits involving compro-
107. See MINN. STAT. §§ 257.19 (1969) (repealed in 1971) and 257.33 (1969)
(amended 1980 and 1981).
108. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 874.
109. "It is next to impossible to formulate a definition of 'privity' in this context
that will apply to all cases." McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 58, 148 N.W.2d
804, 807 (1967). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 14.
111. See supra note 13.
112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
113. The court, however, specifically noted the duty of the commissioner of Pub-
lic Welfare "to take care that the interests of the child are safeguarded [and] that
appropriate steps are taken to establish his paternity." Johnson v. Hunter, 447
N.W.2d at 875 (quoting MiN. STAT. § 257.33 as it appeared in 1969). Yet the court
brushed aside this concern, stating "we doubt whether Johnson's interests were ad-
equately represented in the 1969 action." Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 875. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that if the court had found that the commissioner had
discharged this statutory duty, Ms. Johnson might well have been bound by the
previous judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41-42.
The legislature in 1969 had assigned the duty of representation of the child to
the commissioner of Public Welfare. MINN. STAT. § 257.33 (1969). The statute was
first enacted in 1917. That language remained intact until the enactment of the
MPA and the accompanying statutory amendments in 1980. The statute has been
amended numerous times since, and the Commissioner of Human Services contin-
ues to have a duty to "offer appropriate social services to . .. [the] child after the
birth of the child." MINN. STAT. § 257.33 (1990). The child presumably would be
entitled to bring an action against the commissioner for failure to perform this
duty, such as failure to pursue a paternity claim in her best interests.
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mise or lump sum payments for support,"l 4 minor children in suits
brought to declare the nonexistence of parent-child relation-
ships,115 and children whose mothers deny the father-child rela-
tionship."i6 Nonmarital children outside these MPA-established
categories may-but under the statute need not-be made parties.
Although these nonmarital children may be identical in every
other respect, and have the identical interests at issue,117 some
nonmarital children receive less protection under the MPA than
others. Such a result is incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court de-
cisions that require all nonmarital children be treated equally
under the law.118
While classification of children solely by marital/nonmarital
status is unconstitutional,"x9 classification of nonmarital children is
not unconstitutional if it bears a substantial relationship to an im-
portant state interest. 20 State interests which meet this test in-
clude avoiding multiple wrongful death actions,' 2 ' discouraging
unfounded inheritance claims and promoting orderly disposition of
property at death,122 preserving traditional marital family units, 2 3
114. MINN. STAT. § 257.60, subd. 1 (1990).
115. MINN. STAT. § 257.60, subd. 2 (1990).
116. MINN. STAT. § 257.60, subd. 3 (1990).
117. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Since the Court has been re-
luctant to rule on the fundamental rights issue, the argument for a liberty interest
in the parent-child relationship between a biological parent and nonmarital child
will not be continued here; it would involve first resolving the proper mode of his-
torical analysis for fundamentals rooted in society's traditions as discussed in
Michael H. and Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
119. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
120. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980)
(citation omitted).
121. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
122. The Supreme Court is reticent to consider inheritance rights of nonmarital
children. Although the Court has compared the protection afforded marital chil-
dren with that afforded nonmarital children to avoid unconstitutional treatment,
nonmarital children as a class are accorded different treatment under state law in
the area of inheritance. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
Although an adjudication of paternity might affect a parent-child relationship
financially, Minnesota courts noted that nonmarital children (whether their pater-
nity was formally adjudicated or not) would inherit through state intestacy laws
only if acknowledged by the putative father. See In re Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330,
178 N.W.2d 714 (1970).
123. The statutory presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married wo-
man was the legislative expression of social policy protecting the traditional unitary
family from disruption and society's aversion to illegitimacy. See Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Even in the face of blood tests indicating a high
probability of paternity, and despite his relationship with the child, the putative
natural father was denied the opportunity to establish paternity and denied visita-
tion. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Moreover, once a parent-child relationship has been established, by presump-
tion or adjudication, courts are reluctant to sever it, not wishing to judicially dis-
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and safeguarding the best interests of nonmarital children in adop-
tion proceedings.124 Because courts meticulously consider pater-
nity, challenges to presumptive paternity are severely restricted;
and once paternity is adjudicated, the order is not easily
overturned.
The issue in Johnson of which interested parties may bring a
paternity action is distinguishable from cases denying nonmarital
children statutory rights. Johnson had been denied protections af-
forded other nonmarital children by the MPA. Other nonmarital
children were mandatorily made parties to their paternity suits,
and their interests-financial, psychological, and emotional-were
considered. The Minnesota legislature did not propose an impor-
tant state purpose for the classification of nonmarital children in
the MPA. When an analogous state interest is lacking, the classifi-
cation of children into those entitled to mandatory joiner and
those who are not is unconstitutional.
The Johnson case demonstrates how the courts must stretch
to prevent inequality when a nonmarital child does not "fit" into
one of the three classes the MPA requires to be joined. Johnson
focused on protecting the "paramount interests of a child in an ad-
judication on the merits of paternity."'125 However, rather than be-
ing able to use the statutory language to ease the way for
nonmarital children to establish paternity, the Johnson court had
to explain how a child not a party to previous paternity litigation
could escape the bars of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The
court's decision was based on policy-based arguments rather than
reliance on the statute.126
The MPA by itself fails to protect every nonmarital child's
interests when a paternity suit is initiated because many
rupt the family or subject the child to renewed stigma of illegitimacy. See, e.g.,
Markert v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. App. 1986).
124. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (biological proof plus an established
parental relationship with the child was necessary to constitute a constitutionally
protected liberty interest); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (not unconstitu-
tional for a statute to require only a mother's consent for adoption of her
nonmarital child).
One might draw the conclusion, especially after Michael H., that biology alone
is enough to establish paternity when an alleged father seeks to deny it, but biol-
ogy-even a 98.07 percent probability of parentage based on blood tests--is not
enough when an alleged father seeks to establish paternity of a child, if the child
has developed a familial relationship with another father-figure. See supra note
123.
125. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 876 (Minn. 1989) (en banc).
126. But see Reynolds v. Reynolds, 454 N.W.2d 271, 272 (Minn. App. 1990), revd
in part on other grounds, 458 N.W.2d 103 (a divorce/custody suit citing Johnson for
the proposition that a "[c]hild must be made party represented by guardian ad litem
whenever presumptive father alleges nonpaternity) (emphasis added).
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nonmarital children will not be joined as parties to the suits. Yet
under Johnson, the court's duty and paramount consideration is
protection of the child's interests.127 As a result, the potential for
future relitigation of paternity suits is a reality. Relitigation could
be allowed whenever children can show their interests were inade-
quately represented. This possibility undermines reliance in the
judicial system and economical use of judicial resources.
B. Reliance Issues in Paternity Suits
The Johnson court did not address the alleged father's right
to rely upon the prior paternity adjudication. In 1969, Terry Lee
Hunter was called into court to defend himself in this paternity ac-
tion.128 He relied on the court's 1969 adjudication, and reasonably
so, since dismissal with prejudice is generally recognized to be a fi-
nal adjudication on the merits.1 2 9 All parties who could bring the
action had done so. 130 The paternity adjudication was undisturbed
for sixteen years. However, because the court recognized the lack
of privity between mother and child, Hunter was forced to prepare
his defense a second time.131
Multiple suits on each paternity action serve neither reliance
nor judicial economy. Under present MPA legislation, multiple ac-
tions can result from any paternity proceeding in which a child is
not made a party, especially in cases like Johnson. Such a prece-
dent may significantly impair judicial efficiency, allowing two or
three suits for every paternity action. Conceivably, because of
each party's unique interests, the state could bring a paternity suit
to collect welfare costs for child support, then the mother of the
child could initiate a paternity suit for expenses incurred during
pregnancy and childbirth, and then the child could bring suit to es-
tablish the parent-child relationship for their particular interests.
In effect, without a statutory joinder requirement for all
nonmarital children, the courts must police themselves, appointing
a guardian ad litem to advocate for the child whenever the possi-
bility of a judgment affecting the rights of that child is imminent.
127. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d at 876.
128. Id. at 872.
129. See supra note 104.
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (including the commissioner of
Public Welfare whom the legislature had charged with the duty of protecting
nonmarital children's interest).
131. The MPA does limit, however, an adjudicated parent's liability for past
child support to "the proportion of the expenses that the court deems just, which
were incurred in the two years immediately preceding the commencement of the
action." MINN. STAT. § 257.66 (1990).
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C. Amendment of the MPA is Necessary
Johnson demonstrates that without mandatory joinder, a sec-
ond suit may be necessary to ensure protection of the child's inter-
ests. The child cannot rely on the state to protect her interests.
The alleged father cannot rely on the court's order. To avoid these
problems, the Minnesota legislature should amend the MPA. The
following amendment will promote judicial economy and reliance
while protecting the rights of the child:
MINN. STAT. § 257.60 Parties
A child shall be made a party to the action establishing pater-
nity.132 If the child is a minor, he or she shall be represented
by a general guardian or a guardian ad litem appointed by the
court. Because a child has specific constitutional rights and in-
terests distinct from those of a parent or the commissioner of
human services, neither the child's parent nor the commis-
sioner of human services may represent the child as guardian
or otherwise.133 The court shall appoint independent counsel
for the child.134 The child, biological mother, each man pre-
sumed to be the father under the parentage act, and each man
alleged to be the biological father shall be given notice of the
action in a manner prescribed by the court and shall be given
an opportunity to be heard.135 The public agency responsible
for support enforcement is joined as a party in each case in
which rights are assigned under section 256.74, subdivision 5.
A person who may bring an action under the parentage act
may be made a party to the action. The court may align the
parties.136
Unlike the current MPA language, this amendment, requir-
ing mandatory joinder of a child as a party, ensures that every
child receives notice and an opportunity for a hearing on her
unique interests. Future courts will not be forced to perform the
Johnson court's "balancing act" between the interests of the child
and the interests of the alleged father, a weighing of the interests
attendant a parent-child relationship and right to freedom from
132. Mandatory joinder is specifically recognized as such by the drafters of the
UPA. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
133. This language notes the distinct, unique interests of the parties to a pater-
nity action, and the inability of the state or parent to represent a child because of
their conflicting interests.
134. Court-appointed independent counsel is mandatory for "a party who is un-
able to pay timely for counsel." MINN. STAT. § 257.69 (1990). Reiterating that right
in § 257.60 as proposed serves to highlight the child as a separate party with distinct
and protectable rights.
135. The child is added to the list of those entitled to notice of the paternity
action.
136. The last three sentences follow the remaining provisions of the Uniform
and Minnesota Parentage Acts. See supra notes 64 and 89, respectively.
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continuing litigation. The amended MPA will be a more efficient
tool in establishing paternity.
Should the Minnesota legislature adopt this amendment,
mandating joinder of the child as a party, the courts will have
clear, unambiguous language upon which to base a decision finding
a nonmarital child's right to bring her own suit alleging paternity.
Future courts will not have to first address corollary issues of com-
peting interests, privity, and res judicata.137 Rather than hindering
the court, the MPA, if amended as proposed, will more effectively
promote the acknowledged interests of a nonmarital child to estab-
lish a parent-child relationship and its attendant benefits and bur-
dens. Future courts will not need to add their gloss to the plain
statutory language of an unamended MPA to prevent an unconsti-
tutional result for different classes of children. The resulting deci-
sions can be based not merely on Johnson but also on clear
statutory language that is in accord with present-day policy ac-
knowledging the specific interests children have in suits adjudicat-
ing their paternity.
Importantly, this amendment will eliminate potential equal
protection problems between nonmarital children who are outside
the scope of MPA's present provisions and those whose interests
are now protected by mandatory joinder.13 8 Minnesota has indi-
cated no rationale for classifying nonmarital children into differ-
ent categories. In fact, the traditional paternalistic approach
towards protecting children's interests would suggest that more
rather than fewer nonmarital children should be protected by our
courts through mandatory joinder. 3 9
The proposed amendment recognizes the child's varied inter-
ests in a paternity determination and brings Minnesota law into
line with current United States Supreme Court decisions.
Conclusion
Although children are not given the same rights as adults,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized children have
certain constitutional rights. The Court has recognized that a clas-
sification based solely on whether a child is born out of wedlock
constitutes discrimination. Denial of equal protection to
nonmarital children under a state's laws is unconstitutional unless
a state can show its classification is substantially related to an im-
portant state interest.
137. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at 873-76.
138. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 124.
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Children have an interest in adjudicating paternity not only
because of support, custody, medical history, emotional, and psy-
chological issues, but also to ensure protection of their property in-
terests, such as workers' compensation benefits, wrongful death
benefits, and veterans' dependent educational benefits, to which
they may be entitled as children of an adjudicated father. The
MPA has taken the first steps to ensure that children are afforded
an opportunity for those interests to be heard by giving children
standing to bring paternity suits. The MPA, however, risks denial
of equal protection to nonmarital children not joined as parties to
their paternity suits. Mandatory joinder, as provided by the pro-
posed amendment, is necessary to ensure that all children's inter-
ests are adequately represented in actions adjudicating paternity-
an action affecting the child's recognized interests in establishing a
parent-child relationship.

